Institutional investors are acknowledged as an influential force worldwide as a result of their large shareholdings and ownership of public equity. Arising from a focus on their investing and shareholding practices and their impact on the listed companies which they have invested in as well as on the economy and society overall, stewardship codes have been introduced in the UK and Malaysia to promote their role as stewards. The key objective of this paper is to evaluate the theoretical and practical issues relating to the relatively recent phenomenon of stewardship of institutional investors in Malaysia through functional and contextual lenses as juxtaposed against the more established practice of stewardship in the UK. It is argued that notwithstanding a similar legal framework for shareholder rights and substantial similarities with regard to the content of the UK Stewardship Code and the Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors and its status as soft law, the market structure and political economic factors which are unique to Malaysia represent a constraint on the effectiveness of the Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors in shaping the practices of institutional investors in Malaysia. As such, recommendations to address issues pertaining to the stewardship of institutional investors in the Malaysian context would need to take into account the theoretical and contextual constraints, although insights may be gained from examining structural issues in the investment industry in the UK.
Introduction
Institutional investors are acknowledged as a force to be reckoned with worldwide as a result of their large shareholdings and ownership of public equity. 1 Institutional Investors (MCII) which was launched in 2014. The MCII is the first stewardship code to be launched in Southeast Asia, and the second of its kind to be introduced in Asia after Japan.
The key objective of this paper is to evaluate the theoretical and practical issues relating to the relatively recent phenomenon of stewardship of institutional investors in Malaysia through functional and contextual lenses as juxtaposed against the more established practice of stewardship in the UK. The UK was chosen as a basis for comparison as the provisions of the MCII are closely aligned with those of the UKSC. Moreover, the contrasting background of the UK's status as a developed economy as compared to Malaysia's position as an emerging economy enables a clearer identification of common themes and issues pertaining to stewardship while drawing out context driven divergences.
It is argued that notwithstanding a similar legal framework for shareholder rights and substantial similarities with regard to the content of the UKSC and the MCII and its status as soft law in both jurisdictions, the differences with regard to the market structure and political economic factors which are unique to Malaysia represent a constraint on the effectiveness of the MCII in shaping the practices of institutional investors in Malaysia. As such, recommendations to address the issues pertaining to the stewardship of institutional investors in the Malaysian context would need to take into account both the theoretical limitations pertaining to stewardship as well as its structural and contextual limitations. This paper will be divided into 5 sections. The first section will examine the foundations of stewardship by institutional investors. It will begin with an exposition on the legal framework of shareholder rights which forms the basis for stewardship followed by the 1-76; Samuel Graves and Sandra Waddock,'Institutional owners and corporate social performance ' [1990] Finally, this paper will conclude with a few summary remarks.
I. The Foundations of Institutional Investor Stewardship

The Legal Framework of Shareholder Rights
The ownership of shares in a corporation gives rise to rights generally established in companies' legislation and modified by the constituent documents of a corporation, where applicable. Shareholder rights are an important determinant of the structure and process of corporate governance, particularly in determining the key relationships between shareholders and other stakeholders (such as creditors) and between shareholders and the board of directors. 3 2 The UK Financial Reporting Council issued a Consultation Paper on a revised UK Corporate Governance Code in December 2017 which included broad questions on stewardship, in anticipation of a more detailed consultation on stewardship to be carried out in the second quarter of 2018. This section will be revised to reflect these changes in due course. 3 Ian MacNeil, 'Activism and collaboration among shareholders in UK listed companies' [2010] 5(4) Capital Markets Law Journal [419] [420] [421] [422] [423] [424] [425] [426] [427] [428] [429] [430] [431] [432] [433] [434] [435] [436] [437] [438] 421 Working Paper NUS Centre of Banking & Finance Law Please do not cite or distribute without prior written consent from the Author April 2018
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The classic definition of a share was laid down in the case of Borland's Trustee v Steel
Bros & Co Ltd 4 as 'the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, but also consisting of mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders inter se in accordance with section 16 of the Companies Act, 1862 '. 5 This definition in Borland's Trustee illustrates the intangible nature of shares which are characterised as choses in action, whereby the ownership of shares confers rights on shareholders which are enforceable by law. 6 The legal nature of the ownership of shares is distinct from the conventional understanding of ownership 7 which is focused on the indefeasibility of interest and the private ownership right to a share may be subject to the right of an offeror to buy out a minority shareholder in a takeover under section 979 of the In addition, the rights attached to a share which shareholders may enjoy are set out in section 71(1) of the Malaysian Companies Act 2016 which states that 'A share in a company, other than preference shares, confers on the holder-(a) the right to attend, participate and speak at a meeting;
(b) the right to vote on a show of hands on any resolution of the company;
(c) the right to one vote for each share on a poll on any resolution of the company;
(d) the right to an equal share in the distribution of the surplus assets of the company;
or (e) the right to an equal share in dividends authorised by the Board.' 11
The rights set out in section 71 (1) Having set out the legal framework of shareholder rights, this paper will now turn to a discussion on the conceptualisation of institutional investors and their exercise of shareholder rights in the capacity of corporate monitors and activists.
Institutional Investors as Monitors and Activists
The growth of the institutional investor in the capital markets, which were widely perceived to have the resources and clout because of its ownership size and resources, brought with it exciting possibilities to play a role as a monitor and an activist. 18 This was vividly illustrated in a germinal paper by Black and Coffee on the British experience of institutional investor monitoring, its limits and their implications on the American institutional investor landscape. 19 The key takeaway of this paper was the observation that UK institutions were more involved in corporate governance than their US counterparts, although the UK institutions were constrained by the cost factor in managing shareholder coalitions and restricted incentives for money managers to invest in monitoring. has been argued that the existence of external blockholders could mitigate the agency conflict and thus promote better corporate governance as they would have greater incentive to monitor the management in view of their bearing a greater portion of the losses arising from managerial opportunism 31 and they would be able to overcome the free rider problem 32 illustrated in the preceding paragraph. Nevertheless, the optimism surrounding blockholders is tempered by the existence of conflicts of interest between controlling or blockholders and minority shareholders. 33
The conceptualisation of institutional investors as monitors and activists to address agency conflicts is an illustration of the dominance of the law and economics perspective and its contractarian view of the corporation in the study of corporate governance. Although valuable in providing a framework to identify the incentives and constraints faced by 27 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, 'Production, information costs and economic organization' [1972] Such actions may be classified as 'exit' or 'voice' in accordance with the model developed by
Hirschman in which they may either sell their shares (exit) or make their dissatisfaction with management known via participative, interactive or combative means (voice), as underpinned by the concept of loyalty to the organisation which it has invested in. 35 Alternatively, shareholder activism may be viewed as encompassing 2 distinct approaches, the first being where long-term investors engage with portfolio companies to improve long-term returns to shareholders and the second where investments are made in undervalued companies on the basis that the intervention may result in changes which lead to a rise in the share price. 36 The first approach is more closely associated with the traditional or mainstream institutional investors and stewardship, while the second approach is more commonly employed by hedge funds. Investment managers acting on behalf of institutional shareholders were concerned that intervention in the affairs of underperforming companies would be time consuming and unlikely to have a significant impact on a diversified investment portfolio. 40 There were also obstacles preventing institutional investor activism which were a result of regulation creating an onus to diversify. 41
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, the spotlight shifted to the role of shareholders in governance to prevent the recurrence of future crises. The House of Commons Treasury stated that 'investors have failed in one of their core tasks, namely the effective scrutiny and monitoring the decisions of boards and executive management in the banking sector.' This observation was supported by findings that institutional investors in the UK generally refrained from qualitative shareholder engagement and that they do not have a significant impact on the market reaction to purchase and sales of shares. 42 The OECD also noted that institutional shareholders tended to be reactive rather than proactive and seldom challenged boards in sufficient number to make a difference. 43 Moreover, the excessive focus of shareholders on short-term proceeds or short-termism and the insufficient engagement of shareholders in corporate governance 44 which were related concerns 45 , were highlighted as the two major complaints against shareholders and their role in the global financial crisis. 46 Be that as it may, it is noted that these criticisms were largely levelled at mainstream institutional investors such as pension funds rather than the emerging hedge funds which specialised in targeting underperforming companies and lobbying for changes to boost shareholder returns. 47 Despite a battering from the Global Financial Crisis, activist hedge funds came back at full strength with campaigns at more than 20% of companies in the S&P 500 between 2009 and 2014. 48 While the role of hedge fund activists in the area of corporate governance is set to grow in light of the increasing willingness of mainstream institutional investors to back their proposals 49 , the focus of this paper will be on the traditional institutional investors and their role in stewardship.
At the same time, policymakers also began to draw upon ideas of a commitmentfocused approach to ownership and universal ownership to encourage investors to engage with the corporations and to look at the long term. 50 From an external perspective, institutional investor stewardship emerged as a result of the growth of privatisation and deregulation, greater reliance on private savings to fund the retirement of the workforce at As will be discussed in greater detail in Section III below, stewardship is closely associated with engagement and dialogue between shareholders of companies and directors, but in practical terms, stewardship transcends engagement. It was described by Adam Smith as 'anxious vigilance' performed by a good owner, related to becoming sufficiently knowledgeable about the operations of a company to exercise its ownership rights. 52 The combination of engagement and information analysis is a determinant of voting decisions, the means by which shareholders are able to hold company boards to account. 53
II. A Chronological Account of the Development of the UKSC and MCII
From Industry Statement to Code
The UKSC began its life as an industry sponsored standard-setting norm which differed from statutory governance provisions and company articles of association in terms of their flexibility and arrangements for monitoring and compliance. 54 There was no formal legal status ascribed to these norms which remained a matter between shareholders and the company as well as the scope to permit non-compliance in appropriate cases. 55
As early as 1991, the Institutional Shareholders Committee ( The CG Blueprint also set out a case for change in the prevailing practices of institutional investors, focusing on the effective exercise of ownership rights which were to be manifested via the expected best practices under the new code for institutional investors 71 .
The document also mooted the creation of a network of institutional investors to represent the common interest of all institutional investors and be a platform to shape and influence a wider sphere of corporate governance culture. 72 Here, the CG Blueprint referred to the UK and Australian experience, and highlighted the Institutional Investor Committee in the UK as an example of an institutional investor representative group. 73 In summary, the CG Blueprint 
III. Stewardship in the UK and Malaysia
UKSC v MCII: Principles, Approach, Oversight
The term 'stewardship' is given a brief description in the UKSC, with an allusion to its aim to 'promote the long-term success of companies in such a way that the ultimate providers of capital also prosper' and a statement that effective stewardship benefits companies, The definition of stewardship in the MCII is more detailed compared to the UKSC with a list of principles which constitute a discharge of effective stewardship responsibilities. While the UKSC refers to the objective of stewardship as promoting the long-term success of companies, the MCII uses the phrase 'long-term institutional investor' and focuses on 'asset owners such as pension funds'. The emphasis on 'asset owner' in the MCII seems odd given that institutional investors are defined to include both asset owners and asset managers, both of which play distinct roles along the investment chain, and this choice of phrasing seems unnecessarily reductionist.
The principles pertaining to disclosure of stewardship responsibilities, management of conflicts of interest in relation to stewardship, monitoring and engagement with investee companies are present in the UKSC and MCII. With regard to the principle of managing conflict of interest, both the UKSC and MCII appear to tacitly accept the presence of conflict of interest situations rather than mandating that potential conflict of interest situations be disclosed and methods of dealing with the conflict of interest explained, points which would be of greater In line with the approach taken in the UK Corporate Governance Code, The UKSC mandates a 'comply or explain' approach whereby a signatory is required to explain why it has not complied with elements of the UKSC which has not been applied or where it has failed to disclose specific information requested in the guidance to the principles. 79 Although the MCII provides that institutional investors should explain how they have applied the principles in the MCII, taking into account the guidance provided under each principle, set out in the form of best practice recommendations, the MCII does not require signatories to explain reasons for non-observance of a principle, unlike the UK position. It is submitted that the omission to require explanations weakens the quality of the disclosures, a point which is borne out later in this paper.
The take up of the UKSC is currently monitored by the FRC, an independent regulator which has oversight of auditors, accountants and actuaries and looks into the Corporate Governance Code and UKSC to promote transparency and integrity in business. 80 was previously tasked with overseeing the implementation of the MCII. In many ways, the IIC is similar to the UK ISC, suggesting that any changes to the MCII to harden its prinicples to regulatory obligations would be more difficult than if undertaken within the UK framework.
Stewardship Practice in the UK
As of 2016, there were almost 300 signatories to the UKSC. 81 This represents a fairly sizeable figure which appears to be a significant marker of the support for the UKSC.
Nonetheless, beyond paying attention to the number of signatories, the key indicators of the success of the UKSC rests on its potential to improve long-term returns to shareholders and to discharge fiduciary obligations to its ultimate investors. 82 Hence, the quality of the engagement, translation of the UKSC principles into compliance and the quality of the disclosures made in compliance statements are important criteria in determining whether the quantity of signatories merely amounts to winning a numbers game without significant practical backing. 83
With regard to the 'comply or explain' approach governing stewardship statements, academic research has pointed to its limitations. MacNeil highlights three major issues: firstly, the fact that institutional investors are left to determine their own policy using the UKSC principles as a guide which militates against the credibility of the 'comply or explain' approach against self-selected standards; secondly, the limited nature of the legal obligation of the As such, to improve the quality of reporting against the UKSC and to encourage greater transparency in the market and maintain the credibility of the UKSC, the FRC introduced a tiering system based on the quality of the descriptions of signatories' approach to stewardship and their explanations in accordance with the 'comply or explain' basis of the UKSC in November 2016. Tier 1, which is at the apex, refers to signatories which provide a good quality and transparent description of their approach to stewardship and explanations of an alternative approach where necessary while Tier 2 describes signatories which meet many of the reporting expectations but report less transparently on their approach to stewardship or do not provide explanations where they depart from provisions of the UKSC.
Tier 3 signatories were those which required significant reporting improvements to ensure a more transparent approach and had not engaged with the process of improving their statements which continue to be generic and provided no, or poor, explanations where they depart from provisions of the UKSC. There is currently no official statement with regard to supporters of the MCII and the nature and significance of being a supporter is unclear. it is proposed that in the next revision of the MCII, the IIC consider setting out clearly and comprehensively the role expected to be played by supporters of the MCII.
IV. Broader Factors Affecting Stewardship
Further to the discussion above, there are also structural issues in the investment management industry which limit effective stewardship. One of these issues is that of shorttermism in investment, which was the focal point of the Kay Review on long-term decision making in the UK equity markets. 95 It was found that the principal causes of such shorttermism were the decline of trust and the misalignment of incentives throughout the equity investment chain. Further, the Kay Review found that public equity markets currently encouraged exit (the sale of shares) over voice (the exchange of views with the company) as a means of engagement, replacing the concerned investor with the anonymous trader.
Additionally, short-term relative metrics which are the norm in the investment management industry are also inimical to developing a long-term view of stewardship. Where performance objectives and financial incentives are short-term, the investment horizons will inevitably follow as well. This could result in damage suffered by investee companies as evidenced by a study conducted by Stanford University in 2014 which showed that: nearly two-thirds of companies (65%) agree or strongly agree that a company whose shareholder base is dominated by short-term investors cannot focus on strategic decisions because of a focus on short-term results and just over half (51%) believe that short-term investors lead a company to focus on cost cutting while the majority of companies (57%) agree or strongly agree that a company whose shareholder base is dominated by short-term investors will have 95 John Kay, 'Independent review on investment in UK equity markets and its impact on the long-term performance and governance of UK quoted companies: Final Report' https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253454/bis-12-917-kayreview-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf accessed 3 March 2018.
Working Paper NUS Centre of Banking & Finance Law Please do not cite or distribute without prior written consent from the Author April 2018 27 reduced market value and/or reduced long-term growth. 96 Indeed, empirical research has indicated that investor horizons matter for engagement : long-term investors intervene more intensively than short-term investors, and engagements are primarily triggered by concerns about a firm's corporate governance or strategy rather than about short-term issues. 97 Some proposals which have been mooted to address this issue include asset owners making sure that the performance metrics and financial incentives applied to asset managers are consistent with good stewardship, e.g. evaluating fund managers using a 5-7 year time horizon, focusing annual reviews on the manager's investment process and determining whether the portfolio assets -in terms of number of holdings, degree of concentration, types of assets, turnover level, valuation rations are in line with the stated philosophy. 98 Oher suggestions pertaining to fee arrangements include introducing performance fees and spreading fee payments over multiple years -in ensuring that the fund manager's incentive structure does not promote too much risk-taking, the investment management agreement should specify the level of risks that the asset owner is prepared to assume. 99 Nonetheless, the difficulty of measuring a company's long-term performance must not be underestimated and the easy availability of short-term indicators such as quarterly report and share prices which may not be indicative of the actual underlying value of the company are also a factor to consider in addressing this issue of short-termism.
Be that as it may, the proposals above must be seen in light of the varying types of investment strategies, some of which may be short-term in nature and which may thus legitimise non-adoption of the principles in the UKSC or the MCII. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the normative question of whether short-term investment 96 28 strategies are consistent with long-term investment objectives and the fiduciary duties which asset owners and asset managers owe to their beneficiaries or clients.
Political Realities in the Malaysian Sphere
It is argued that context is critical, particularly with regard to emerging economies such as Malaysia which possess a different institutional context, politics, history and ownership structure from that of developed economies. 100 In this light, it is worthwhile examining the distinct features of the Malaysian political and economic milieu to understand their impact on the stewardship of institutional investors.
The shareholding structure of many Malaysian listed companies is concentrated, rather than the dispersed shareholding commonly found in the USA and the UK. 101 fund's approach to stewardship, a re-evaluation of the current 'comply or explain' format.
The wide scope of the questions points to a clear and urgent need to determine the path ahead for the role of institutional investors and the stewardship codes.
Based on these questions, it would appear that the FRC has begun to take into consideration the possibility that previous versions of the UKSC had been overly focused on the monitoring role of shareholders, resulting in an unnecessary relegation of the importance of other stakeholders. 114 It had been argued that shareholder activism and the management response are motivated exclusively by financial incentives, resulting in there no longer being a substantive concept of shareholder democracy independent of market demands. 115
Moreover, this repeated concentration on shareholders had also been described as unimaginative and path-depending. 116 Hence, to the extent that there were problems with the incentives of institutional investors to spend on stewardship, stewardship codes putting forward aspirations, principles or guidelines are likely to have less of an impact than if investment managers had appropriate incentives. 117 Attention should therefore be paid to the structure of institutional investing and share ownership to address the issues which have arisen since the introduction of the UKSC.
The need for structural reform of the investment industry has been highlighted in both the Kay Review and other academic research. 118 In this regard, the share ownership chain has become longer and more complicated as a result of more intermediation, making it a far cry from the original theoretical model. Working Paper NUS Centre of Banking & Finance Law Please do not cite or distribute without prior written consent from the Author April 2018 32 member of the corporation 119 entailing ideas of participation, identity, responsibility and obligation 120 rather than a passive observer. In other words, the shareholder is now part of a collective enterprise 121 . It follows that the shareholder now has both a formal role (e.g. voting)
and an informal role (e.g. private negotiations with the corporation prior to the shareholders' meeting) 122 which are encapsulated within the UKSC principles.
Increased intermediation is also an issue in the context of the fund management industry, which typically relies on relative financial performance, indices or other benchmarks measured over short periods and bases its fee structure on the size of assets under management. This incentivises fund managers to attract more assets under management than to improve the performance of the assets already under management. In other words, it is easier to pay more to attract more assets by carrying out more marketing and by paying distribution fees than to make the efforts that improve the performance of shares in the portfolio. 123 Therefore, apart from the short-term measurement canvassed earlier, the question of the fee structure of asset managers needs to be reviewed as well.
On another point, the FRC's question on the inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders and the consideration of ESG factors raises the question as to whether the FRC intends for the UKSC to more clearly incorporate socially responsible investing into stewardship, as has already been incorporated into the MCII and is a keystone in the United Nations Principles for Another issue which requires further exploration is what clients or beneficiaries can do to help promote stewardship practices. This would mean a relook at the current paradigm in which the balance of power is seen to be tilted towards asset owners and asset managers rather than beneficiaries or clients and correspondingly, reform is concentrated on the more powerful. Be that as it may, the beneficiary's voice should also carry weight and the concept of 'beneficiary engagement' should be examined in greater depth. In this regard, retrospective transparency and accountability to beneficiaries about decisions taken by asset managers and asset owners and the reasons may prove helpful in creating a greater sense of accountability. 124
Conclusion
In summary, the UKSC and the MCII are functionally similar yet contextually different.
The presence of common structural factors arising from the investment industry and its impact on institutional investor stewardship indicates that there may be convergence in seeking solutions. Nevertheless, the identification and articulation of the unique contextual constraints in Malaysia, juxtaposed against its absence in the UK context, is the first step in addressing them, although in view of the entrenched nature of these issues and their linkage with the incumbent political scenario at play, it would not be realistic to expect short-term changes.
It is critical to ensure that apart from the incentivising the take up of stewardship codes which are fundamentally voluntary, there is structural support which encourages the development of a long-term, sustainable approach to investments. Apart from a focus on the overarching structures governing asset owners and asset managers which has been studied previously, structural support also includes addressing the role of the individual beneficiary
